As I write this, the new Macs with Intel Core Duo
processors inside are available. I was about as shocked as anyone when
Steve Jobs announced that he would discontinue Macintosh computers with
the IBM PowerPC Architecture and instead develop new machines with Intel
chips. It just didn't make sense to me on several levels, and, while I
could develop theories that made sense of the move, everywhere I
proposed these theories on Mac blogs and boards, people debunked the
theories. And because I work for IBM, specifically for a division that
promotes partnerships, I worried that my bias in favor of IBM's PowerPC
Architecture would color my opinions.
With all this on my mind, I
decided to do something I haven't often done in this column: I consulted
with an impartial expert--Mark Margevicius, Research VP for the
GartnerGroup, specializing in the personal computing industry. We had a
wide ranging phone interview in which I proposed a bunch of theories and
he either debunked them or endorsed them. After checking my theories
against the leading expert in the field, they make a lot more sense than
the Mac bloggers give me credit for.
Before I get to the theories,
here's what didn't make sense to me. First, it didn't make sense to deny
15 years worth of talk, by Apple, that Intel chips weren't good enough
for the Mac. A key component of the Mac's success has always been about
differentiating from the vanilla PC, both in terms of hardware and
software. Mac's differentiation on hardware was the PowerPC. Look at what Apple
said about the PowerPC G5 chip prior to announcing the switch to
Intel.
I won't reproduce what Apple says, except to briefly give
the PowerPC advantages. The primary advantage is 64-bit addressing,
which is a big deal for graphics-intensive applications. All other PC
processors are 32-bit, limiting memory space to 4 gigabytes. In 64-bit
processors, memory addressing is virtually unlimited. The PowerPC is
also the first PC processor to provide symmetric multiprocessing, which
allows several applications to work in parallel rather than one at a
time. Some versions of the processor are dual-core, which typically
increases performance in parallel environments by around 25 percent.
Contrary to Apple's stated reason for switching, the PowerPC is
also known for producing the least amount of heat of any PC processor.
Consider this fact: IBM produces a line of BladeCenter servers based on
the PowerPC 720 chip--the same chip that runs earlier versions of G5
Macs. The IBM BladeCenter chassis houses up to 14 blade servers--28
dual-core processors--in a box the size of a '90s-style PC. Because the
PowerPC is relatively cool, the whole box can be cooled by two fans.
Finally, there is a huge disincentive to switch chip
architectures: You force independent software vendors and your installed
base to migrate their applications to the new platform. Fortunately for
Apple, most of the available applications compiled for the PowerPC
platform are also available for the Intel platform: Quark, InDesign,
Photoshop, Illustrator, Office, etc. Smaller partners will need to
migrate, but my guess is Apple doesn't care too much about them in the
scheme of things.
But the installed base is a concern. What it
means for the largest customers--publishers and design shops--is that
they will need to either upgrade all their applications to take
advantage of the new systems or they will need to run the old
applications in an emulator. Any performance benefits from the new
architecture are erased by the emulator, so there's little incentive for
Apple's largest customer base to upgrade hardware from PowerPC to Intel.
Given the cost of new machines plus new software in these high-end
graphics businesses, the cost/benefit ratio for doing that cannot be
overcome over the life of the product.
Now to the theories. The
first theory is cost. As Margevicius confirmed, Intel gave Apple a
sweetheart deal to switch to the Core Duo chip. Intel can afford to do
this while IBM cannot because the vast majority of the market--Dell, HP,
Lenovo, etc.--builds systems for the same chip line. So Intel can have
thinner margins on its chips than IBM and make up the difference on
volume. IBM's BladeCenter JS20 and JS21 machines that feature the
PowerPC chip are not produced in PC volumes at this time.
The risk
for Apple, as I've said above, is to reduce its hardware
differentiation. Apple owners love the fact that they "Think Different."
Margevicius likens them to BMW owners, who pay more for cars that are
different from the norm. To extend the analogy, Apple's move would be
like BMW developing a partnership with Toyota to put Lexus engines in
Beamers.
This risk is deferred by two factors: First, Apple can
choose to pass some of the chip savings onto its customers. This will
act as a promotional tool for its key differentiator: OS X. When more
users can afford PCs with OS X on them, they will see first hand how
vastly superior the operating system is from Windows (more on this
later).
"It's not as though the hardware differentiation is
helping Apple gain market share now," Margevicius says. "As long as
Apple's losing market share, it might as well save money in the
process."
Second, as the benchmarks show, the Core Duo is a very
fast chip in its own right. I'm still a little dubious as to whether
these benchmarks test memory addressing in a way that shows the
advantages of a 64-bit architecture. But especially in the laptop
market, where the PowerPC does not have a dual-core offering, the Core
Duo shows up to 20 percent performance advantages over the G5 chip.
My main theory is that Apple wants to ultimately get out of the
PC hardware business and focus on OS X. How does this work? Well, right
now, Intel Apple computers do not allow users to create partitions for
dual-boot mode, that is, you can't have both Windows XP and OS X on the
same machine. But future versions will allow this dual boot mode with
Windows Vista. This will allow users to compare the OSes side by side
and see how superior OS X is. That's the promotion. Margevicius says
this is likely ruled out by Apple's agreement with Microsoft for Windows
XP, and at least and not yet ruled out for Windows Vista.
"We
don't see those partnership agreements, but Microsoft can probably
choose to discontinue Office for the Mac if Apple violates certain
terms, such as not creating Intel-based systems that allow users to run
Windows and OS X side by side," he says.
It also makes sense that
Apple's agreements with Microsoft prevent Apple from licensing OS X to
other PC manufactures in direct competition to Windows. If Apple really
wanted to get out of the PC business, this would seem the most likely
avenue. It would boost the use of OS X overnight and that would help
Apple's other businesses. Ultimately, OS X would be a Windows
killer.
Though Apple is openly trying to thwart hackers from
illegally attaining OS X and working to get it installed on non-Apple
PCs, I think it's inevitable and Margevicius agrees. Apple even wrote
special code in OS X including a poem for hackers in anticipation of
this possibility. When hackers get their hands on OS X, it could spread
like Linux. In this way, Apple could be conforming to the letter of its
agreements with Microsoft while secretly hoping that OS X spreads like a
virus that kills Windows. Once OS X is out of the bag, Apple's
agreements with Microsoft can be reworked to allow for limited
licensing.
Margevicius and I agreed that Jobs has short- and
long-term plans that led to switching to Intel chips. In the short run,
he can get bigger margins on the Mac by holding his costs down. Long
term, he can get out of the PC business by allowing OS X to slip out
into general use. Because margins on operating systems are better than
on PCs, he can drastically change Apple's business prospects in the
process.
"Steve Jobs is a shrewd businessman," Margevicius says.
"He knows there's no money in hardware. This is his play to finally get
out of the PC hardware business."
James Mathewson is editor at
large of ComputerUser and lead editor for the IBM ISV Business Strategy
and Enablement organization.